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RELIEF FROM CONVICTIONS BASED UPON
PERJURED TESTIMONY-A PROPOSAL
FOR A REASONABLE STANDARD
The defendant is charged with first degree murder for the shoot-
ing death of a gas station attendant. He is tried jointly with the co-
defendant, who was allegedly an accomplice in the offense. At trial
the prosecution presents a tenuous case against both of the defen-
dants. Then the co-defendant presents his case, declining to testify.
The defendant next offers an alibi, presenting two witnesses to sup-
port it. After the defendant concludes, the co-defendant takes the
witness stand in rebuttal. He testifies to being at the scene of the
murder, and to seeing the defendant murder the gas station atten-
dant by shooting him in the back. The jury finds the defendants
guilty of first degree murder and sentences them to death.
Approximately six months later, the co-defendant executes an
affidavit admitting that he perjured himself in his testimony against
the defendant and that the defendant's alibi was true. He further
admits that it was he and not the defendant who had shot the gas
station attendant. Upon the strength of this affidavit, the defendant
seeks to have a new trial granted in light of this newly discovered
confession.' He finds that there is no relief available under existing
California law.' The penalty is carried out.
This comment explores the possible avenues of relief for a de-
fendant convicted with perjured testimony, and demonstrates that
neither a motion for new trial, nor writs of habeas corpus or coram
nobis provide him with a remedy unless the perjured testimony was
"knowingly" used by the prosecution. The comment then examines
other jurisdictions' solutions to this problem, and proposes to rectify
the present law's injustice by means of a new statute.
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
The California Penal Code provides that a defendant who has
been convicted of an offense may receive a new trial on the grounds
1 He would apply under California Penal Code Section 1181, subsection 8, which
provides: "When a verdict has been rendered of a finding made against a defendant,
the court may upon his application, grant a new trial, in the following cases only:
8. When evidence is discovered material to the defendant which he could not,
with the exercise of reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at
trial. .. ."
CAL. PEN. CODE § 1181(8) (West 1970).
2 This case is presently pending before the California Supreme Court. People v.
Schwerdtfeger and Magris, Criminal Appeal #14559 (Cal. Sup., filed April 23, 1970) ;
In re Schwerdtfeger, Criminal Appeal #14550 (Cal. Sup., filed August 26, 1970).
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of newly discovered evidence.' However, the defendant must show
that the evidence qualifies under certain criteria.' He must first
demonstrate that the evidence could not have been discovered at
trial with the exercise of due diligence.' The evidence itself-and
not merely its importance-must be newly discovered.' The new
evidence must be more than impeaching. Furthermore, the defen-
dant is required to show that the verdict would probably have been
changed, if this evidence had been introduced during the trial.7 In
support of the above contentions, the defendant must file with the
court affidavits of the witnesses he expects to call, stating that they
will testify to the newly discovered evidence.8
Although it would appear that the defendant in the above hypo-
thetical situation could obtain relief under this statute, California
courts have held almost without exception that the admission of
perjury by a prosecution witness does not constitute newly dis-
covered evidence for the purposes of the statute.' This is true even
where a co-defendant has admitted sole responsibility for the of-
fense.'
In People v. McGaughran" the defendant was convicted of
rape on the testimony of the prosecutrix. After trial she executed an
affidavit exonerating the defendant and admitting she had lied
about the incident at trial. The trial court denied the defendant's
motion for a new trial and the appellate court upheld the ruling.
The court of appeal reasoned that the purported evidence was for
the jury's consideration because it was cumulative and impeaching.
Hence, a new trial was unwarranted.
California courts have been extremely reluctant to grant new
3 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1181 (West 1970).
4 People v. Owens, 252 Cal. App. 2d 548, 552, 60 Cal. Rptr. 687, 691 (1967).
5 Where perjury was suspected at the time of trial, the petitioner must show why
it was not investigated and brought out at the trial. People v. MacArthur, 125 Cal.
App. 2d 212, 218, 270 P.2d 37, 41 (1954). See also People v. Lewis, 105 Cal. App. 2d
208, 233 P.2d 30 (1951) ; People v. McCoy, 58 Cal. App. 534, 208 P. 1016 (1922).
6 People v. Rodriguez, 168 Cal. App. 2d 452, 461, 336 P.2d 266, 272 (1959).
7 People v. Greenwood, 47 Cal. 2d 819, 306 P.2d 427 (1957); accord, People v.
Huskins, 245 Cal. App. 2d 859, 54 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1966), where the court states:
"Newly discovered evidence which would tend merely to impeach a witness is not of
itself sufficient ground for granting a new trial." Id. at 862, 54 Cal. Rptr. 256; see also
People v. Long, 15 Cal. 2d 590, 607, 103 P.2d 969, 978 (1940).
8 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1181(8) (West 1970).
9 See generally People v. Love, 51 Cal. 2d 751, 336 P.2d 169 (1959); People v.
Andrus, 159 Cal. App. 2d 673, 324 P.2d 617 (1958); People v. Jones, 89 Cal. App.
2d 151, 200 P.2d 65 (1948); People v. Yankee, 79 Cal. App. 2d 431, 179 P.2d 528(1947); People v. Snyder, 36 Cal. App. 2d 582, 97 P.2d 976 (1940); People v.
Lim Foon, 29 Cal. App. 270, 155 P. 477 (1915).
10 People v. Monroe, 162 Cal. App. 2d 248, 328 P.2d 483 (1958).
11 197 Cal. App. 2d 6, 17 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1961).
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
trials on the strength of affidavits,"2 even in situations where the
foundation of the prosecution's case has been totally destroyed by
affiants who admit their former testimony or identification was in-
tentionally erroneous."3 In People v. Smith 4 the defendant was con-
victed of child stealing.1" After the trial four of the prosecution's
prime witnesses swore in affidavits that they had testified falsely
during the trial and that the defendant was innocent. Nevertheless,
the court held the fact "that perjured testimony was given in the
case at the time of trial, does not afford a basis for a reversal of the
judgment."' 6 Motions for new trial are always looked upon with
disfavor and distrust, and reversal will only be ordered in cases of
a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court in overruling the defen-
dant's motion for a new trial.'7
The situation changes little when the perjured testimony is
that of a co-defendant rather than a disinterested witness. The
earliest California case dealing with the recantation of a co-defen-
dant is People v. Tallmadge.'8 In Tallmadge the defendant and co-
defendant were charged with larceny. The co-defendant became
the principal witness in the case by admitting to the crime and im-
plicating the defendant. Both were convicted. The defendant moved
for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The
motion was supported by an affidavit in which his co-defendant
admitted that the defendant had not participated in the crime. He
further swore that his perjured testimony was solicited by the
prosecutor, who promised the co-defendant that if he would testify
against the defendant the state would dismiss his charges and pay
him $200. The appellate court held that such an affidavit did not
warrant overruling the trial court for its refusal to grant the motion
for new trial. The trial court is presumed to have properly exercised
its discretion, and:
The affidavit of such a person is not entitled to so much weight as
to justify the conclusion that the evidence given by him, and which
the jury may have regarded as reliable and credible, was corruptly
and willfully false. The conclusion of the jury would rather warrant
the presumption that his testimony was truthful and his affidavit false.' 9
12 People v. Munton, 218 Cal. App. 2d 556, 32 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1963) (affidavits
alone rarely sufficient for new trial).
13 See People v. Smith, 17 Cal. App. 2d 468, 476, 62 P.2d 436, 440 (1963).
14 17 Cal. App. 2d 468, 62 P.2d 436 (1936).
1r CAL. PEN. CODE § 278 (West 1970).
16 People v. Smith, 17 Cal. App. 2d 468, 476, 62 P.2d 436, 440 (1936).
17 See People v. Langlois, 220 Cal. App. 2d 831, 34 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1963);
People v. Loar, 165 Cal. App. 2d 765, 333 P.2d 49 (1958).
18 114 Cal. 427, 46 P. 282 (1896).
19 Id. at 431, 46 P. at 283.
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Only two cases in the history of California jurisprudence have
permitted a new trial on the basis of affidavits alleging non-knowing
use of perjury by the prosecution. These decisions, however, rested
upon highly unusual facts. For example, in People v. Williams20
the California Supreme Court granted a motion for a new trial
to a defendant who had been convicted of ordering his ex-wife's
lover to disrobe, and then stealing his clothes which were valued at
less than one hundred dollars. After the conviction the defendant's
former wife's mother swore in an affidavit that she was at the scene
of the alleged robbery, and that no robbery ever took place. She
stated that the entire story had been fabricated by the victim of
the robbery and the defendant's ex-wife for the purpose of discredit-
ing the defendant. In ordering a new trial the court based its deci-
sion upon the fact that the victim's testimony was totally uncor-
roborated, that the affiant was unbiased and had no motive to swear
falsely, and that the affiant had not been called as a witness during
the trial.2
In an equally unique case, People v. Huskins,22 the defendant
had been convicted of molesting2" his six-year-old daughter. The
mother brought the charges against the defendant. After his trial
and conviction, the defendant discovered that the mother had sug-
gested the story to her daughter to keep the defendant from taking
the child in divorce proceedings. The mother had a history of mental
illness and was committed to an asylum shortly after the conclusion
of the trial. The court, in granting a new trial, held that the com-
bination of these highly unusual factors destroyed the veracity of
the prosecution's case.24
However, in People v. Gaines,25 where the credibility of the
prosecution's case was destroyed as in the above cases, the court
held that a motion for new trial was unwarranted. In that case the
appellant was convicted of robbery upon the testimony of his co-
defendant. After trial the co-defendant, who had also been con-
victed, admitted that the defendant's alibi was true and he, not the
defendant, had committed the robbery. Again the court rejected the
affidavit filed by the defendant in support of his motion for new trial.
The court distinguished People v. Williams,26 noting that in Williams
the witness was unbiased and disinterested. The court, however,
20 57 Cal. 2d 263, 18 Cal. Rptr. 729, 368 P.2d 353 (1962).
21 Id. at 271-74, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 733-36, 368 P.2d at 357-60.
22 245 Cal. App. 2d 859, 54 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1966).
23 CAL. PEN. CODE § 288 (West 1970).
24 245 Cal. App. 2d 859, 862, 54 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (1966).
25 204 Cal. App. 2d 624, 22 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1962).
26 57 Cal. 2d 263, 18 Cal. Rptr. 729, 368 P.2d 353 (1962).
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failed to recognize that the co-defendant in Gaines had much more
at stake than the affiant in Williams. At the very least the co-defen-
dant was guilty of perjury, a felony under California law." The
co-defendant also jeopardized his chance for an early parole by
admitting that he had lied during the trial.
Nevertheless, the courts have steadily upheld convictions in
the face of false testimony. In People v. Monroe28 the defendants
had been found guilty of robbery. The co-defendant arose after the
verdict was rendered and informed the court that in the interest of
justice he did not want to see an innocent man go to jail. The co-
defendant then told the court that he had committed the robbery
with two other individuals and the defendant had not participated
in the crime. The defendant then made a motion for a new trial
based upon the co-defendant's statement, but the trial court and
the appellate court both held that a new trial was not in order.
The basis for these decisions is clear. The appellate courts are
unwilling to overrule the trial court's exercise of discretion since
questions of the veracity of witnesses are for the determination of
the jury. For this reason the appellate courts have refused to over-
rule cases where the credibility of the prosecution's case is based
upon admittedly perjured testimony, even though the witness sub-
jected himself to the possibility of criminal liability for perjury.29
WRIT OF CORAM NOBIS
Coram nobis is a common law writ designed to supply a remedy
for criminal convictions where statutes fail to do so.30 In California
coram nobis has found recognition in both case8' and statutory
law. 2 Thus it would seem that a defendant convicted on the basis of
27 CAL. PEN. CODE § 118 (West 1970): "Every person who, having taken an
oath that he will testify . . . in any of the cases in which such an oath may by law be
administered, wilfully and contrary to such oath, states as true any material matter
which he knows to be false, . . . is guilty of perjury."
28 162 Cal. App. 2d 248, 328 P.2d 483 (1958).
29 Cf. People v. Asher, 273 Cal. App. 2d 876, 78 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1969); People
v. Lerner, 11 Cal. App. 2d 208, 53 P.2d 194 (1936).
30 A writ of coram nobis is the same as a writ of coram vobis except that the
latter is addressed to an appellate court while the former to the trial court. Accord In
re Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 387 P.2d 6 (1963).
31 See In re Dapper, 77 Cal. Rptr. 897, 454 P.2d 905 (1969); People v. Cantrell,
197 Cal. App. 2d 40, 16 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1961); People v. MacFadden, 130 Cal. App.
2d 131, 278 P.2d 99 (1955); Application of Carr, 73 Cal. App. 2d 697, 167 P.2d 243
(1946).
82 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1265 (West 1970): "After the certificate of the judgment has
been remitted to the court below, the appellate court has no further jurisdiction of the
appeal . . . ; provided, however, that if a judgment has been affirmed on appeal no
motion shall be made or proceeding in the nature of a petition for a writ of error
[Vol. I11
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perjured testimony, being unable to obtain a new trial on the stat-
utory ground of newly discovered evidence, might reasonably argue
that a writ of coram nobis should be issued ordering a new trial.
In order for a petition of coram nobis to be granted, a petitioner
must show that some fact existed which, without any fault or negli-
gence on his part, was not presented at the trial-and which, if
presented, would have prevented rendition of judgment.3 3 The stand-
dard for coram nobis approximates that of granting a new trial on
the ground of newly discovered evidence 4.3  This similarity has led
some courts to hypothesize that the writ of coram nobis is dead as a
practical matter in California. 5
Consequently, the defendant suffering from a conviction based
upon perjured testimony can find no remedy through this writ. A
writ of coram nobis is not available to review errors where a stat-
utory remedy, such as an appeal or a motion for new trial, is pro-
vided. 6 In People v. Reid37 the California Supreme Court observed:
At the time this writ [coram nobis] came into general use there was no
remedy by appeal or by motion for new trial .... As these new [statu-
tory and appellate] remedies have come into existence by statutory
enactment, they have supplanted this ancient writ as to so much of its
former scope as is comprehended in and covered by the statutory
remedies .... 38
California Penal Code Section 118109 precludes the use of a writ
coram nobis even though the evidence is not discovered until after
the time for filing a motion for new trial has elapsed or the motion
for new trial has been denied. 0 In the case of In re De La Roi4'
the Supreme Court of California denied reversal of the petitioner's
conviction even though the newly discovered evidence consisted of
a confession by a fellow convict that he, and not the petitioner, had
coram nobis shall be brought to procure the vacation of said judgment, except in the
court which affirmed the judgment on appeal. .. "
33 See People v. Mendez, 28 Cal. 2d 686, 171 P.2d 425 (1946); People v. Gilbert,
25 Cal. 2d 422, 154 P.2d 657 (1944).
34 See CAL. PEN. CODE § 1181(8) (West 1970).
35 See generally People v. Reid, 195 Cal. 249, 232 P. 457 (1924); People v. Davis,
187 Cal. 750, 203 P. 990 (1922) ; People v. Mooney, 178 Cal. 525, 174 P. 325 (1918).
36 People v. Williams, 238 Cal. App. 2d 585, 48 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1965). See gen-
erally People v. Sutton, 115 Cal. App. 2d 751, 252 P.2d 633 (1953) ; People v. Vernon,
9 Cal. App. 2d 138, 146, 49 P.2d 326, 328 (1935) (the court stated that it is only when
no trial on the merits has been had and no remedy provided that we may look to the
common law).
37 195 Cal. 249, 232 P. 457 (1924).
38 Id. at 255, 232 P. at 460.
39 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1181(8) (West 1970).
40 People v. Shipman, 62 Cal. 2d 226, 42 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1965).
41 28 Cal. 2d 264, 275, 169 P.2d 363, 370 (1946).
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committed the offense. Nor does discovery and proof that perjury
was used at trial justify issuance of the writ. 2
Furthermore, the existence of the writ of habeas corpus pre-
vents use of coram nobis. The California Supreme Court held in
People v. Adamson" that the expansion of the function of the writ
of habeas corpus has precluded the use of a writ of coram nobis
in examining convictions relying on perjured testimony. "Thus, the
appropriate writ to secure relief from a judgment of a conviction
obtained by the use of false testimony . . . is not coram nobis but
habeas corpus."'44
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The writ of habeas corpus is recognized in Section 1473 of the
California Penal Code as the means by which "[e]very person un-
lawfully imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, under any pretense
whatever, may ... inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or
restraint."45
A petition for habeas corpus is the appropriate avenue to chal-
lenge a judgment and sentence based upon perjured testimony, 46
but the petitioner must show that such perjured testimony was
"knowingly" used by the prosecution. 7 In the case of In re
Mooney" the petitioner was convicted for the bombing deaths of
ten persons. The petitioner alleged that key prosecution witnesses
had perjured themselves. The California Supreme Court refused to
issue the writ holding that the petitioner must not only prove per-
jury, but also that the perjury was "knowingly" used by prosecuting
officials. The court noted that "[p]roof of perjury alone, without
satisfactory substantial proof of knowledge thereof or connivance
therein by the prosecuting official can avail the petitioner nothing
in this proceeding .... )49
This principle has been affirmed by the court in numerous deci-
sions,5° and was extended in the case of People v. Smith.5 In Smith
42 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
43 34 Cal. 2d 320, 210 P.2d 13 (1949).
44 Id. at 327, 210 P.2d at 16.
45 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1473 (West 1970).
46 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); People v. Adamson, 34 Cal. 2d
320, 210 P.2d 13 (1949).
47 People v. Rosoto, 62 Cal. 2d 684, 43 Cal. Rptr. 828, 401 P.2d 220 (1965).
48 10 Cal. 2d 1, 73 P.2d 554 (1937).
49 Id. at 15, 73 P.2d at 561.
50 See, e.g., In re Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 387 P.2d 6 (1963) (the California
Supreme Court denied petitioner's writ for habeas corpus). In 1969 the Federal
District Court in effect overruled the California Supreme Court and granted petitioner's
[Vol. 11
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the appellate court held the fact "that perjured testimony was given
in the case at the time of the trial, does not afford a basis for a
reversal of the judgment. ' 52
Unless state officials "knowingly" used the perjured testimony,
a writ of habeas corpus will not be issued.53 A defendant could,
hypothetically, have all of the prosecution's witnesses swear that
they had been paid by a third party to testify falsely against the
defendant, but unless he could prove that the prosecution "knew"
of the perjury, no relief from the conviction would be available in
California.
The problem is that neither a motion for new trial nor a writ
of habeas corpus provides relief from perjured testimony-except
in the narrowly defined situation of the prosecutor's "knowing" use
of that testimony. The courts have taken out of the province of the
writ of coram nobis relief obtained with ordinary, non-knowing use
of perjured testimony.54 However, they have nowhere provided an
alternative means of relief. This problem was recognized by the
court of appeal in People v. Williams.55 However, the court declined
to correct the situation in the absence of a pronouncement from a
higher court.5 6
ALTERNATIVES-OTHER JURISDICTIONS' SOLUTIONS
By a liberal construction and application of their statutes allow-
ing new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence,57 the
courts in jurisdictions outside of California solve the problem of
non-knowing use of perjured testimony. Kentucky's interpretation
of its statute is illustrated in Mullins v. Commonwealth.5" There the
writ of habeas corpus. The court recognized that there was authority that knowing
use by the prosecution should not be the sole criterion for determining whether or not
the conviction was tainted by the perjury. However, the court held there was suffi-
cient knowledge of the perjury by the prosecution to grant a new trial in this case.
Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795 (C.D. Cal. 1969). See generally In re Carman,
48 Cal. 2d 851, 313 P.2d 817 (1957) ; In re Allen, 47 Cal. 2d 55, 301 P.2d 577 (1956) ;
In re Razutis, 35 Cal. 2d 532, 219 P.2d 15 (1950); People v. Adamson, 34 Cal. 2d
320, 210 P.2d 13 (1949); In re Wallace; 24 Cal. 2d 933, 152 P.2d 1 (1944) ; People v.
Hollins, 164 Cal. App. 2d 191, 330 P.2d 246 (1958) ; In re Bronaugh, 100 Cal. App. 2d
220, 223 P.2d 256 (1950).
5' 17 Cal. App. 2d 468, 62 P.2d 436 (1936).
52 Id. at 477, 62 P.2d at 440.
53 In re Mooney, 10 Cal. 2d 1, 73 P.2d 554 (1937).
54 Accord People v. Adamson, 34 Cal. 2d 320, 210 P.2d 13 (1949).
55 238 Cal. App. 2d 585, 48 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1965).
56 Id. at 597, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 75. See also, In re Branch, 74 Cal. Rptr. 238
(1969).
57 See State v. Greeno, 342 P.2d 1052 (1959); State v. Sullivan, 43 N.J. 209,
203 A.2d 177 (1964).
58 375 S.W.2d 832 (1964).
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defendant was a police officer convicted of voluntary manslaughter
of a suspect he was apprehending pursuant to an arrest warrant. At
trial the decedent's common law wife testified that the defendant had
shot her husband while he sat eating at a table. After the officer's
conviction, the witness sent a sworn affidavit to the authorities stat-
ing that her testimony at trial was false and that the decedent had
attacked the officer. On the strength of the affidavit the court re-
versed the officer's conviction, granting him a new trial. Quoting
from an earlier case, 9 the court noted:
We recognize the general rule to be that a new trial will not be granted
for newly discovered evidence which is only impeaching in its nature.
But the rule should be cautiously applied and when the discovered
evidence is of such a compelling weight that it probably would have
induced the jury to reach a different verdict, a new trial will be
granted. 60
Similarly, when the prosecutrix retracted her testimony that
the defendant raped her, an Oklahoma court granted the defendant's
motion for a new trial.6 ' Again, in Texas a new trial was allowed
when a witness stated in an affidavit that he did not know he was
under oath at the time of trial, and he now wanted to tell the truth.62
Illinois applied its new trial statute in People v. Busch63 where
the defendant, who had been indicted with others, was convicted
for conspiracy to burn a stock of goods with intent to defraud an
insurance company. Two weeks after the trial a co-conspirator, who
had testified for the prosecution, Swore in an affidavit that he had
been paid by the insurance company to perjure himself in his
testimony against the defendant. The appellate court, recognizing
that without the affiant's testimony the defendant would probably
not have been convicted, granted him a new trial.
Decisions holding that a new trial should be ordered in cases
where the conviction of a defendant has been obtained through the
non-knowing use of perjured testimony can be found in eleven
states,6 4 as well as in the federal courts.6 5
59 McGregor v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.2d 624 (1952).
60 Id. at 652. Accord Shepard v. Commonwealth, 267 Ky. 195, 101 S.W.2d 918
(1937); Elkins v. Commonwealth, 245 Ky. 199, 53 S.W.2d 358 (1932); Hensley v.
Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 367, 43 S.W.2d 996 (1931); Tyree v. Commonwealth, 160
Ky. 621, 170 S.W. 33 (1914).
61 Martin v. State, 34 Okla. Crim. 274, 246 P. 647 (1926).
62 Wadkins v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 292, 277 S.W. 684 (1925).
63 228 Ill. App. 11 (1923).
64See, e.g., Roath v. State, 185 Ark. 1039, 50 S.W.2d 985 (1932); Tyree v.
Commonwealth, 160 Ky. 621, 170 S.W. 33 (1914); People v. Busch, 228 Iln. App. 11
(1923); People v. Smallwood, 306 Mich. 49, 10 N.W.2d 303 (1943), State v. Greeno,
342 P.2d 1052 (1959) (Montana Supreme Court); State v. Sullivan, 43 N.J. 209,
203 A.2d 177 (1964) ; Martin v. State, 34 Okla. Crim. 274, 246 P. 647 (1926); Wadkins
[Vol. I1I
COMMENTS
In Martin v. United States"6 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit ruled that the trial court has a duty to order a new trial
where a witness has admitted that he had committed perjury, or
was mistaken as to a material element of the case against the defen-
dant. The court said:
There is no way for a court to determine that the perjured testimony
did not have controlling weight with the jury, and, notwithstanding
the perjured testimony was contradicted at the trial, a new light is
thrown on it by the admission that it was false; so that, on a new
trial, there would be a strong circumstance in favor of the losing party
that did not exist, and therefore could not have been shown, at the
time of the original trial.67
The problem of a defendant being convicted on the basis of per-
jured testimony was again considered in United States v. Mitchell,68
where the defendant was convicted of selling narcotics and was
sentenced to a five-year prison term. After trial an informant who
had been instrumental in convicting the defendant admitted that he
had lied in his identification and that the defendant was innocent.
The court ordered a new trial, although the informant, at a post-
trial examination of the evidence, again reversed his testimony and
reaffirmed his earlier identification of the defendant. In its decision,
the court held that since the police records contained a picture of
another black man with the same name, the possibility of a mistaken
identification was enough to merit granting a new trial in the in-
terest of justice.
Unlike California, which gives primary importance to whether
the testimony was for the consideration of the jury or whether the
perjury was "knowingly" used by the prosecution, courts outside
of California are concerned with the possibility that the defendant
was wrongly convicted. This concern was demonstrated by the
United States Supreme Court, which noted in Mesarosh v. United
States:"
The dignity of the United States Government will not permit the
conviction of any person on tainted testimony. This conviction is
tainted [with perjury], and there can be no other just result than to
accord petitioner a new trial.70
v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 292, 277 S.W. 684 (1925); Hodnett v. City of Danville, 152
Va. 955, 146 S.E. 281 (1929); State v. Elliot, 6 Wash. 2d 393, 107 P.2d 927 (1940);
Epsy v. State, 54 Wyo. 291, 92 P.2d 549 (1939).
65 Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956) ; United States v. Mitchell, 29
F.R.D. 157 (D. N.J. 1962); Martin v. United States, 17 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1927);
Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928).
66 17 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 527 (1927).
67 Id. at 976.
68 29 F.R.D. 157 (D. N.J. 1962).
69 352 U.S. 1 (1956).
70 Id. at 9.
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PROPOSED STATUTE
To conform to the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court
that a defendant should not be convicted on the basis of perjured
testimony as to a material element of the prosecution's case against
him, the California legislature should enact the following curative
statute:
When a material witness for the prosecution, subject to cross ex-
amination and being fully aware that he may incur criminal
liability for perjury, appears before the court in which a convic-
tion of a crime was decreed, and admits giving perjured testimony
regarding a material element of the prosecution's case against the
defendant, which may have changed the outcome of the proceed-
ings against such defendant if discovered during the trial, such
court may order a new trial on the motion of the defendant.
This statute deals only with situations in which the court is
reasonably satisfied that the testimony given by a material witness
was false, that without it the jury would probably have reached a
different verdict, and that the party seeking the new trial did not
know of the falsity at the time of the trial, or could not have
countered it.
71
The witness's admission is strengthened if he is aware of the
fact that his recantation may subject him to criminal liability for
perjury.72 Recognizing the inherent weakness of granting a new trial
on mere affidavits, the witness, subject to cross examination, is re-
quired to admit the perjury before the original trial court. When
the above criteria are fulfilled the court determines whether the re-
cantation is reliable. If the trial judge concludes that it is reliable,
he has the power to order a new trial.
CONCLUSION
If this proposed statute were enacted, a defendant who is con-
victed with admittedly perjured testimony could have a new trial,
untainted by this perjury.
His remedy would not depend on the inadequate provisions
presently regulating the motion for new trial, nor on the superficial
criterion of "knowing use" for habeas corpus.
No rational distinction can be made between the test of "know-
ing use" and "non-knowing use" of the perjured testimony by the
prosecution. A conviction in either case rests upon intentional false-
hoods. Such convictions undermine the system of criminal justice.
lames S. Greenan
71 Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928).
72 CAL. PEN. CODE § 118 (West 1970); see note 27, supra.
